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UNIT DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE
MEYERS - MILIAS - BROWN ACT: AN ANALYSIS
OF ALAMEDA COUNTY ASSISTANT PUBLIC
DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY
OF ALAMEDA
The Meyers-Milias-Brown (NIMB) Act,1 governing the labor rela-
tions of local government employees in California, went into effect on
January 1, 1969.2 While the act gives important new rights to "rec-
ognized" employee organizations, 3 it fails to answer the initial question
of who should bargain with whom. In an orderly system, unit deter-
minations4 must be made before recognition is granted to a bargaining
representative for only then can effective bargaining take place.5 A
major defect of the MMB Act is its failure to provide procedures and
criteria for the establishment of units and recognition of employee or-
ganizations.6 This deficiency is compounded by the fact that the only
recourse for binding settlement of disputes as to these matters is to ob-
tain a court decision. 7
This note discusses Alameda County Assistant Public Defenders
Association v. County of Alameda," the first California appellate court
decision to deal in detail with unit determinations under the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act. Its purpose is to explore the probable direction of
1. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 3500-10 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1974).
2. For a detailed analysis of the act, see Schneider, An Analysis of the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act of 1968, 1 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. A-1 (Feb. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as Schneider]; and more recently, Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining in California:
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 719 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Grodin].
3. A "recognized" employee organization is one formally acknowledged by the
public agency as an employee organization that represents employees of the public
agency. See text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
4. The bargaining unit is a defined group of jobs for which a recognized em-
ployee organization bargains. Schneider, Unit Determination: Experiments in Califor-
nia Local Government, 3 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 1, 3 (Oct. 1969). Unit determination
is the process by which jobs are divided up into appropriate units for the purpose of
formal bargaining. Id.
5. See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
6. See Grodin, supra note 2, at 729-43.
7. See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
8. 33 Cal. App. 3d 825, 109 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973).
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future case law in light of the precedent set by that decision. It will
argue that the decision in that case should not be extended to deal with
all questions of unit determination, but rather should be limited to its
facts. It will go on to consider how future litigation may deal with the
issue of unit determination, which is left unresolved by the legislation
itself. In examining the court's opinion, it is necessary to understand
the structure and direction of labor relations under the MMB Act;
therefore a short summary of the act follows as a preliminary to the
discussion of the case.
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
In 1961 the California legislature enacted the Brown Act9 to gov-
ern labor relations with all state and local government employees. This
legislation was amended in 1968 as it related to local employees and
became the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act.10 The Brown Act still applies
to state employees and in 1971 was renumbered and codified as Gov-
ernment Code sections 3525-36. The Brown Act, as originally enacted
and as in effect today, gives state employees "little more than the right
to join or not to join employee organizations, and the right of employee
organizations to be heard on employment matters affecting mem-
bers."11 It does not require bargaining according to the private sector
model; rather, it merely establishes a minimum level of communication
between employers and employee organizations. 12 The statute speaks
only of the obligation of the state
[to] meet and confer with representatives of employee organiza-
tions upon request, and [to] consider as fully as [it] deem[s] rea-
sonable such presentations as are made by the employee organiza-
tion on behalf of its members prior to arriving at a determination
of policy or course of action. 13
Essentially, the language places the state government under a duty to
listen to each employee organization when it speaks "on behalf of its
members." The term "employee organization" is defined generally as
"any organization which includes employees of the state and which has
as one of its primary purposes representing its members in employer-
employee relations."' 4  Therefore the Brown Act presumably imposes
a duty upon the state government to meet and confer with as many or-
ganizations as its various employees might wish to join.' 5
9. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1964, § 1, at 4141 codified CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3500-
11 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1974), renumbered as H9 3525-36 (Supp. 1974).
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500-10 (West 1966), as amended (Supp. 1974).
11. Grodin, supra note 2, at 719.
12. Id. at 725.
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3530 (West Supp. 1974).
14. Id. § 3526(a).
15. Grodin, supra note 2, at 730.
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The organizational rights of local public employees under the
MMB Act are comparable to those given state employees under the
Brown Act.' 6 The MIMB Act, however, is markedly closer to the mo-
del of collective bargaining existing in the private sector. 7 What had
been a duty to listen under the Brown Act became a duty to bargain
under the MMB Act.'s
The preamble to the MMB Act augmented the prior legislation
by stating as an additional purpose to promote full communication be-
tween public employers and their employees by providing a reasonable
method of resolving labor disputes in the public sector. 9 The
"method" is further delineated in sections 3503-05, which set forth pro-
visions for the organization, scope of representation and rights of em-
ployee organizations, including the requirement that the public agency
meet and confer in good faith. This latter requirement of "good faith"
imposes an obligation upon both the public agency and any recognized
public employee organization to meet promptly at the request of either
party, to confer for a reasonable period of time, and to endeavor to
reach agreement on employment matters. 20  Although the parties are
not required to agree, and the actual character of a good faith endeav-
or is difficult to define, this section clearly bans unilateral action by
a public agency with respect to employment matters. 2 '
This duty to "meet and confer in good faith" is imposed upon the
public agency only with respect to a recognized employee organization,
which is defined as one "which has been formally acknowledged by the
public agency as an employee organization that represents employees
of the public agency. ' 22  "Formal acknowledgment," however, is not
defined, and the only condition imposed is that such recognition shall
not be unreasonably withheld. 23  Nevertheless, recognition is important
since only recognized employee organizations gain the substantial rights
granted to organizations by the MMB Act.24 Moreover, as will become
16. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3502-04, 3506 (West Supp. 1974), with id. §§
3527-29, 3531.
17. Grodin, supra note 2, at 730.
18. Id. at 732. See Schneider, supra note 2, at A-3. The legislature denied public
employees full collective bargaining by excluding them from the coverage of section 923
of the California Labor Code under which private employees have the right to strike.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3509 (West 1966).
19. Id. § 3500.
20. Id. § 3505.
21. Grodin, supra note 2, at 753-54.
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501(b) (West Supp. 1974).
23. Id. § 3507.
24. Except in cases of emergency a public agency is required to give reasonable
written notice to each recognized employee organization affected by proposed changes
relating to employment matters and to give the organization the opportunity to meet
with the agency on the question. Id. § 3504.5. If agreement is reached between the
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evident from this discussion, problems of recognition are inextricably
intertwined with those of unit determination in establishing who bar-
gains with whom."
Under the MMB Act the creation of units in the first instance is
left to the public agency.26 The conferral of such discretion is con-
sidered a major defect in the act since the public agency as employer
has a vested interest in the outcome. 27 Moreover, although unit struc-
ture is critical to effective bargaining,28 the MMB Act sets up no proce-
dures to be followed by public agencies in determining units and estab-
lishes no criteria with respect to unit determinations generally.
Section 3507 does authorize public agencies to adopt reasonable
rules and regulations for the administration of the act after consultation
in good faith with employee organizations. Such rules and regulations
may include provisions on various subjects specified in the section, in-
cluding "exclusive recognition of employee organizations formally rec-
ognized pursuant to a vote of the employees of the agency or an ap-
propriate unit thereof" and "such other matters as are necessary to carry
out the purposes of this chapter. '29 However, the only binding remedy
for violation of the act is court action, and the standard for judicial re-
view of unit determination is the vague critierion of "reasonableness."
It is important to note that the meet-and-confer model"0 of the
MMB Act is substantially more comprehensive than the meet-and-listen
approach of the Brown Act. Although the MMB Act does not grant
full collective bargaining rights to public employees,3 1 it is a movement
in that direction, particularly in light of the 1971 amendment which
permits an agency to grant exclusive recognition to an organization as
bargaining representative for the employees of the agency or an ap-
public agency and the recognized employee organization, they must jointly prepare a
nonbinding written memorandum of understanding and present it to the governing body
or its representative for determination. Id. § 3505.1. If the public agency and recog-
nized employee organization fail to reach agreement, they may agree on the appointment
of a mediator to assist in reconciling the dispute. Id. § 3505.2. Public agencies must
allow a reasonable number of recognized employee organization representatives a reason-
able amount of time off without loss of pay or other benefits when formally meeting
with agency representatives on employment matters. Id. § 3505.3.
25. See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1974).
27. E.g., Grodin, supra note 2, at 741-42; Rosen & Reith, A Report and Commen-
tary on Unit Determination, 13 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 2, 6 (June 1972).
28. See text accompanying note 105 infra.
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1974).
30. For a general description of the meet-and-confer approach, see ADvisoRy
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR
STATE AND LOcAL GOvERNMENT 12-19 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as ACIR REPORT].
31. Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 36, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518,
521 (1969).
November 1974]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
propriate unit thereof.32
The purposes of the MMB Act stated in the preamble are twofold:
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote full communication be-
tween public employers and their employees by providing a rea-
sonable method of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment between public employ-
ers and public employee organizations. It is also the purpose of
this chapter to -promote the improvement of personnel management
and employer-employee relations within the various public agencies
in the State of California by providing a uniform basis for recogniz-
ing the right of public employees to join organizations of their own
choice and be represented by such organizations in their employ-
ment relationships with public agencies.
33
This dual purpose of providing a reasonable method for resolving labor
disputes and a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public em-
ployees to join and be represented by employee organizations is then
qualified by the following language:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the provi-
sions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and rules
of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit or civil
service system or which provide for other methods of administering
employer-employee relations . ... This chapter is intended, in-
stead, to strengthen merit, civil service and other methods of ad-
ministering employer-employee relations through the establishment
of uniform and orderly methods of communication between em-
ployees and the public agencies by which they are employed.
3
1
Professor Joseph Grodin discusses the issue presented by this qualifying
language, namely "whether and to what extent the qualifying language
reflects a willingness on the part of the legislature to permit local regu-
lation of covered subjects,' 35 and concludes that the quoted language
protects only those local labor relations methods "which are consistent
with, and effectuate the purposes of, the statute as a whole. 36
The California Court of Appeal in Los Angeles County Firefighters
Local 1014 v. City of Monrovia3 7 rejected the city's contention that sec-
tion 3500 exempted the city from the MMB Act since its preexisting
rules and policies "provide for other methods of administering employ-
er-employee relations. '38  The court ruled that the legislature did not
intend to preempt the field of public employer-employee relations ex-
cept where public agencies do not provide reasonable "methods of ad-
ministering employer-employee relations through . uniform and or-
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1974).
33. Id. § 3500.
34. Id.
35. Grodin, supra note 2, at 724.
36. Id.
37. 24 Cal. App. 3d 289, 101 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1972).
38. Id. at 294, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82.
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derly methods of communication between employees and the public
agencies by which they are employed."9 Thus, the rules and regula-
tions promulgated by public agencies must implement the general pur-
poses of the MMB Act and must conform to its provisions for employee
organization and representation as well as the other various duties and
obligations which it imposes. To the extent that local rules and regula-
tions do not meet these standards they are deemed unreasonable and
are therefore preempted by the MMB Act.
By enacting a comprehensive statewide statute which overrides lo-
cal rules and regulations not meeting its statutory standard, the legisla-
ture has undertaken to govern local public labor relations. This is a
laudable endeavor; however, the legislation suffers from a major flaw.
As Professor Grodin has observed:
A logical description of any statutory system of industrial relations
should start by asking who is supposed to bargain with -whom. As
a practical matter, -the answer may be more significant than what
the law says they bargain about, or how they bargain, or what they
do with the bargain once it -is made. Bargaining structure is bound
to have substantial effect upon what happens in the bargaining
process no matter what the law may say. Unfortunately, it is pre-
cisely at this recognition stage that the MMB Act begins to bog
down.
40
Because questions of recognition and unit determination cannot be
avoided, the legislature's failure to provide statutory guidelines is bound
to result in litigation to resolve these issues. The preliminary question
presented is whether a public agency must give recognition to every
employee organization petitioning for recognized status upon a showing
that the organization has members who are employees of the agency.
As will be demonstrated, a requirement of general recognition will not
further the purposes of the MMB Act and in fact will undermine the
bargaining structure contemplated by the act.41 Unfortunately, in the
Public Defenders decision, the court failed to confront this issue directly
even though the question of general recognition underlay much of the
court's reasoning.
The Public Defenders Case
In Alameda County Assistant Public Defenders Association v.
County of Alameda,42 the Alameda County Board of Supervisors had
enacted, pursuant to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, an ordinance to reg-
ulate the organization and administration of county employer-employee
39. Id. at 295, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 82, citing CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West
Supp. 1974).
40. Grodin, supra note 2, at 729.
41. See text accompanying notes 50-77 infra.
42. 33 Cal. App. 3d 825, 109 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973).
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relations. Acting under these regulations, the Public Defenders As-
sociation petitioned the county for recognition as the representative of
attorneys employed in the public defender's office. Rather than estab-
lish a separate bargaining unit for the public defenders, however, the
county created Unit XI, which grouped the attorneys with all other non-
health-related professional employees, including librarians, planners,
agricultural inspectors, auditors, buyers, systems and procuring analysts,
appraisers and engineers.
Apparently accepting this classification, the Public Defenders As-
sociation formed a coalition with three other employee organizations,
including the Western Council of Engineers. The organization, known
as the Coalition of Professional Employees, filed a petition for certifica-
tion with the county as the recognized employee organization for Unit
XI, challenging a similar petition previously filed by the Alameda
County Employees Association. A secret-ballot election resulted in
a majority vote favoring the Alameda County Employees Association
as the exclusive recognized employee organization for the unit. The
Public Defenders Association then petitioned the Alameda County Su-
perior Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the county to establish
a separate unit for the attorneys in the public defender's office. The
trial court denied the petition, finding that Unit XI had been estab-
lished in accordance with law and that the Public Defenders Asso-
ciation was not entitled to a unit separate from Unit XI.4
3
On appeal the court, applying the "community of interest" test,
44
concluded that the attorneys in the public defender's office are sui gen-
eris and reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that since
the attorneys not only had an organization of their own choice, but also
had little, if any, community of interest with the other professional em-
ployees in Unit XI, it was unreasonable to force them into the larger
unit. Since Government Code section 3507 requires that unit deter-
minations be made on a reasonable basis and the establishment of Unit
XI failed to meet that standard, the court concluded the writ must is-
sue.
4 5
Although it may be argued in the future that the Public Defenders
case stands for the proposition that any group of public employees who
can show a distinct community of interest are, as a matter of law, en-
titled to a separate unit, this note will argue that, based upon an analysis
of the opinion, the MMB Act, and related authorities, the Public De-
fenders case should not be considered as precedent for so broad a prop-
osition.
43. Id. at 827-28, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
44. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
45. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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At the outset of its opinion the court in Public Defenders framed
the issue of unit determination as follows:
Question Presented
Does the establishment of Unit XI illegally deny the Assistant Pub-
liec Defenders ...the right to representation by a professional or-
ganization of their own choice? 46
Later the court restated the problem in the following language:
[Tihe real question is whether, in view of the fact that the assist-
ant public defenders had an organization of their own and chose
to have it as their sole bargaining body, the county could deny or-
ganization representation and force the public defenders into Unit
XI.47/
Finally, the court presented the question a third time:
Another way of stating the issue is whether requiring all profes-
sional employees, regardless of their type, to be in one organization
for the administration of employer-employee relations is reasonable
and appropriate, in view of section 3507, providing that the county
may adopt "reasonable rules and regulations" and may create "ap-
propriate" units for this purpose.
48
This latter formulation presents the most precise statement of the issue
actually decided but fails to construe the language giving employees the
right to be represented by an organization "of their own choice."49
The difficulty the court encountered in formulating the issue stems
from its conclusion that a reasonable and appropriate unit is somehow
dependent upon whether a group of employees included therein wish
to be represented by an organization different from that chosen by a
majority of employees in a unit. This issue of general recognition will
be considered first, followed by a discussion of the court's ruling that,




As stated above, the MIMB Act gives substantial new rights to
"recognized" employee organizations. Whether unit determination is
a problem depends on the recognition system adopted by a public
agency- 1  The public agency may adopt a system of general recogni-
tion, thereby granting recognition to any organization which can show
it has members who are employees of the public agency and who wish
46. Id. at 827, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
47. Id. at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
48. Id.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODa § 3500 (West Supp. 1974).
50. See text accompanying notes 20 & 24 supra.
51. Schneider, supra note 2, at A-12.
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to be represented by that organization.52 If this approach is chosen
the establishment of bargaining units is unnecessary.53
A second suggested system of recognition is one under which the
public agency grants "recognized" status only to organizations selected
by majority vote of agency employees, but allows "minority" groups to
make presentations and to have such presentations taken into consid-
eration by the public agency.54 A third system of recognition involves
the selection of a single bargaining agent elected by majority vote in a
particular unit. This exclusive bargaining agent must fairly represent
all employees in the unit, whether or not they are members of the
employee organization, and other organizations are precluded from
negotiating with the agency on employment matters. 55 If either of the
latter two systems is adopted, the particular group of public employees
(or unit) for which the recognized employee organization will bargain
must be determined prior to recognition.
The County of Alameda adopted rules and regulations pursuant
to which employee representation units were established, and recog-
nition was granted only to those organizations elected by a majority of
employees within a unit as their bargaining agent. 6 The Public De-
fenders Association argued that the assistant public defenders were en-
titled to representation by their own bargaining organization under
Government Code section 3500,17 which provides that one purpose of
the MMB Act is to improve employer-employee relations
by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public em-
ployees to join organizations of their own choice and be represented
by such organizations in their employment relationships with public
agencies.58
The court noted this contention but neither explicitly accepted nor re-
jected it. Rather, it stated that while Unit XI might be appropriate
for professional employees who do not have their own organization, the
real question was whether the county could recognize the Public De-
fenders Association once it had been chosen by the attorneys as their
sole bargaining representative. 9 Having framed the issue in this man-
ner, the court never explictly discussed it; in its conclusion, however,
it did state that denying recognition to the Public Defenders Associa-
52. Id. at A-1.
53. It will be argued below that although the provisions of the MMB Act permit
a public agency to adopt such a policy, the act should not be construed to require gen-
eral recognition.
54. Schneider, supra note 2, at A-11.
55. Id. at A-12.
56. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 827-28, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
57. Id. at 828-29, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
59. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
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tion "violates section 3507 of the Government Code in that [through
such a denial] professional employees with common interests and hav-
ing an organization of their own choice, are unreasonably forced into
an organization with other employees with whom there exists little, if
any, community of interest."6 °  The construction placed upon the
phrase "of their own choice" is crucial. In view of the broad impact
upon employer-employee relations and the structure of bargaining under
the MMB Act, it is unfortunate that the court construed this language
by implication only, neither analyzing the problems involved nor con-
sidering the ramifications of such construction.
The Difficulty of General Recognition
If the argument of the Public Defenders Association is accepted,
then any organization which can show that it has members who are em-
ployees of the public agency and who wish to be represented by that
organization is entitled to recognized status. Furthermore, if a public
agency wished to grant exclusive bargaining status to one employee or-
ganization pursuant to rules and regulations adopted under Govern-
ment Code section 3507, it would be required to establish a separate
unit for each group of employees with an organization "of their own
choice." The result would be to require either recognition of every
organization with public employee members without regard to the es-
tablishment of units, or the establishment of a multitude of units, each
having an exclusive bargaining representative. In either case, the sole
criterion for the establishment of a unit would be a desire by a group
of employees to be represented by that particular organization.
Such a result would be chaotic and thus should be rejected, not
only because it contravenes the specific purpose of the MMB Act to
provide "a reasonable method of resolving disputes,"61 but also because
it is in conflict with the overall structure of bargaining contemplated
by other provisions of the act. The 1968 amendments to the Brown
Act added the term "recognized" as descriptive of employee organiza-
tions to which rights, duties and obligations of the MMB Act accrue;
62
and section 3507 provides that recognition shall not be unreasonably
withheld, suggesting that an agency may reasonably withhold recogni-
tion under some circumstances. The further addition of the 1971 "ex-
clusive" recognition amendment63 supports an argument that the legis-
lature intended that public agencies might, without violating the act,
adopt rules and regulations which preclude a policy of general recogni-
tion.
6 4
60. Id. at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (emphasis added).
61. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
62. Id. § 3503, amending id. § 3503 (West 1966).
63. Id. § 3507 (West Supp. 1974).
64. See Sacramento County Employees Org. Local 22 v. County of Sacramento,
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A requirement of general recognition cannot logically be recon-
ciled with the clear language of section 3507 permitting exclusive rec-
ognition of a bargaining representative pursuant to a vote of the em-
ployees. If a public agency were required to recognize every organiza-
tion which could show that its members included agency employees,
then a vote of the employees to determine an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative would serve no purpose and this agency option would be
foreclosed.
Only when a sole employee organization wished to represent the
public employees could the public agency recognize that organization
as representative for the employees without a vote, and it would in ef-
fect be the "exclusive" bargaining representative. If more than one
organization sought to represent the employees, then a vote would be
meaningless, since the public agency would be required to recognize
both employee organizations. In order to grant "exclusive" status to
a bargaining representative the public agency would have to establish
a separate "appropriate" unit for every group of employees choosing a
particular employee organization to represent them.
The court in Public Defenders noted that the Public Defenders
Association brief stated that 92 percent of attorneys in the public de-
fender's office wished to be represented by the Public Defenders Asso-
ciation. 5 Under the argument advanced by the association, the 8 per-
cent who did not choose the Public Defenders Association would be
entitled to representation by an employee organization "of their own
choice." Thus, if it wished to grant exclusive bargaining representative
status, the public agency would necessarily be required to establish two
separate units for the public defender's office alone. Presumably the
same treatment would have to be afforded to a third faction of the pub-
lic defenders if it chose to be represented by an entirely different or-
ganization. The end result would be that the clear language of section
3507 permitting "exclusive recognition of employee organizations for-
mally recognized pursuant to a vote of the employees of the agency
or an appropriate unit thereof' would be rendered meaningless.
NLRA Decisions Persuasive
The court in Public Defenders noted that judicial construction of
the language of the National Labor Relations Act"o would be persuasive
in construing similar language in the MMB Act.67 Such construction
28 Cal. App. 3d 424, 104 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1972) (upholding the deduction of dues only
from the wages of members of an employee organization recognized as exclusive bar-
gaining agent for a unit).
65. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 828, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
66. NLRA §§ 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
67. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394, citing International Ass'n of
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lends support to the argument that the language of the MMB Act grant-
ing public employees the right "to join organizations of their own choice
and be represented by such organizations"68 should not be construed
to require a public agency to recognize every organization which can
show it has members who are employees of the agency and wish to
be represented by that organization.
Section 7 of the NLRA provides in part that "[e]mployees shall
have the right . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing. . . -69 In construing this language the United
States Supreme Court held the right of employees to bargain col-
lectively through a representative "of their own choosing" is subject to
the condition that the bargaining unit be one declared appropriate by
the National Labor Relations Board:
70
The petitioners' contention that § 9(a) grants to the majority of
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes the absolute right
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing is correct only in the sense that the "appropriate unit" is the
one declared -by the Board under § 9(b), not one that might be
deemed appropriate under other circumstances.
71
Thus, under the NLRA, the board first establishes an appropriate
bargaining unit; once this is done, the employees have the absolute
right to be represented by an organization of their own choosing or,
if they so choose, by no organization at all. Whether or by whom the
employees choose to be represented is typically determined by majority
vote in a secret-ballot election conducted by the NLRB. Even though
a minority of employees in the unit may wish to be represented by
a different organization, they will be bound by the choice of the ma-
jority. The language which allows employees to be represented by an
organization "of their own choosing" does not confer on a minority of
unit members the absolute right to separate representation .
7
8
The MMB Act provides that a public agency may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations, which may include provision for "exclusive recog-
nition of employee organizations formally recognized pursuant to a vote
Firefighters v. County of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387, 392, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270, 274
(1962). "The precedents established in the private sector under the National Labor Re-
lations Act have been repeatedly referred to by various state boards, especially where
there is a parallel or analogous statutory provision involved." Shaw & Clark, Determi-
nation of Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152, 163
n.72 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Shaw & Clark].
68. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1974).
69. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
70. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
71. Id. at 152-53.
72. For the enabling statute respecting elections, see NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1970).
73. 313 U.S. at 152-53.
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of the employees of the agency or an appropriate unit thereof. .... 74
The court in Public Defenders noted that the phrase "an appropriate
unit" parallels the language of NLRA section 9 (a) allowing the NLRB
to certify labor organizations selected by a majority of employees in a
"unit appropriate for such purposes. ' 75  By reference to the Supreme
Court holding in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. NLRB 0 construing
language similar to that of the MMB Act, it seems clear that the right
of public employees under section 3500 to be represented by an organi-
zation "of their own choice" should be subject to the condition of sec-
tion 3507 that the bargaining unit be an appropriate one established
under reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the public agency.
A requirement of general recognition is not in conformity either
with the declared purpose of the MMB Act to provide a reasonable
method of resolving labor disputes or with the structure of bargaining
established by the act. In analyzing the concept, Professor Grodin has
stated:
To require a public agency to meet and confer in good faith, as
that phrase is currently defined, with every organization which can
prove it has members within the agency and to extend to all such or-
ganizations the privileges ancillary to recognition is simply not feas-
ible for large public employers. Such a requirement would place
too great a burden upon the public agency; it would foster rivalry
and dissension among organizations; and, by making negotiations
more complex and agreement more difficult, it would tend to frus-
trate the stated objectives of the statute. Meeting and conferring
in the MMB Act sense could not effectively take place in such a
framework.
77
Individuals and the MMB Act
Although a proliferation of units in the public sector is considered
by many writers to be undesirable, 78 the court in Public Defenders
stated that the establishment of a separate unit for the assistant public
defenders would not place an increased burden on the county79 in
light of Government Code section 3502, which grants to public em-
ployees "the right to represent themselves individually in their employ-
ment relations with the public agency."8  The court did not expand
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
75. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
76. 313 U.S. 146 (1941).
77. Grodin, supra note 2, at 734.
78. E.g., D. BOK & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 324
(1970) [hereinafter cited as BoK & DUNLOP]; Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in
the Public Service: The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Rock]; Shaw & Clark, supra note 67, at 173.
79. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
80. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3502 (West 1966).
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further on this statement, and it is exceedingly difficult to see how the
court could have reached its conclusion or what implications may rea-
sonably be drawn therefrom since presumably an individual employee
could not claim the extensive rights extended to employee organizations
under the MMB Act.
Although it did not cite the case, the court seems to have been
following the line of reasoning set forth in Los Angeles County Fire-
fighters Local 1014 v. City of Monrovia.81 There the city had enacted
an ordinance recognizing an employee association as the only organ-
ized group that could speak on behalf of all city employees in their em-
ployment relations. Twenty of the city's twenty-one firefighters be-
longed to the plaintiff union which sought and was granted a writ of
mandate compelling the city to recognize the union formally as the bar-
gaining representative of the firefighters. The court of appeal af-
firmed. 2
In a rather cryptic opinion, the court construed the purpose of the
MMB Act to include "the right of public employees, as individuals and
as members of organizations of their own choice, to negotiate on equal
footing with other employees and employee organizations without dis-
crimination . ".3..",3 The court held that a city's recognition of a
municipal employee association as the only organized group that could
speak on behalf of city employees in their employment relations,
coupled with an unwritten "open door policy" under which all individ-
uals and organization representatives were permitted to speak, did not
constitute sufficient compliance with the MMB Act. The court found
this system to be defective because individuals and unrecognized organ-
izations were placed thereby in a secondary position relative to recog-
nized organizations and might not be aware of their right to speak un-
der the "open door policy"; thus, the rights, duties and obligations were
not extended as provided by the act to unrecognized employee organ-
izations and individuals.8 4
Neither City of Monrovia nor Public Defenders squarely consid-
ered whether an individual might claim all of the rights, duties and ob-
ligations extended under the MMB Act to recognized employee organ-
81. 24 Cal. App. 3d 289, 101 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1972).
82. The court made its decision under both the Firefighters Act and the MMB
Act. Although Government Code section 3501(d) specifically includes local firefighters
under the MMB Act, Labor Code sections 1960-63, enacted in 1959, protect the organ-
izational rights of both state and local firefighters. The Firefighters Act obligates a
public agency to negotiate with the union or association chosen by the firefighters. In-
ternational Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Palo Alto, 60 Cal. 2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr.
842, 384 P.2d 170 (1963).
83. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 295, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
84. Id. at 295-96, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
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izations. Such a construction of the act, however, would seem to be
both unreasonable in light of the overall bargaining structure contem-
plated by the act and contrary to the clear language of certain sections
setting forth the duties of public agencies under the act.
In accord with the purpose and intent of the act,85 a public agency
is required to give written notice of proposed legislation affecting work-
ing conditions to recognized employee organizations 6 and to meet and
confer in good faith with such organizations.87 The written memoran-
dum agreement required by section 3505.1 and the mediation provi-
sions of section 3505.2 apply only to recognized employee organiza-
tions, as does section 3507 authorizing the agency to adopt reasonable
rules and regulations after consultation with representatives of em-
ployee organizations.88 In short, the substantial duties imposed upon
public agencies under the MMB Act are generally imposed only in rela-
tion to organizations which public employees may choose to join and
designate as their representative. It would be unreasonable, and there-
fore contrary to the purpose set forth in section 3500, to impose upon
a public agency the duty to extend to each individual employee the sub-
stantial rights granted to recognized employee organizations by the act.
The legislature obviously did not intend to place such a burden on pub-
lic agencies.
Furthermore, turning to judicial interpretation of the NLRA for
guidance, it has been held to be fundamental that "the principle of col-
lective bargaining presupposes that there is more than one eligible per-
son who desires to bargain. The Act therefore does not empower the
Board to certify where only one employee is involved. ' 8  Although
the MMB Act establishes a meet-and-confer bargaining structure rather
than full collective bargaining, it is fundamental that a meet-and-confer
method of resolving labor disputes also presupposes a bargaining unit
of more than one individual employee. The reasoning of the court in
City of Monrovia and in Public Defenders to the effect that section
3502 and the general purposes of the MMB Act require the substantial
duties and obligations of a public agency to be imposed in relation to
individual employees is dicta which should not be followed by courts
in the future. If the issue is ever squarely before the court, the above
analysis would support a holding that although individual employees re-
tain the right to represent themselves individually in their employment
85. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1974). See text accompanying note
33 supra.
86. Id. § 3504.5.
87. Id. § 3505.
88. Id. §§ 3505.1, 3505.2, 3507.
89. NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting Lucken-
back Steamship Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1936).
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relations with the public agency employer, they are not given the sub-
stantial rights which accrue to employee organizations.
The Absence of General Unit Criteria
Accepting the argument that the MMB Act does not require gen-
eral recognition of every employee organization which can prove it has
members who are agency employees, and further, that a public agency
may, in accordance with the clear provisions of section 3507, adopt rea-
sonable rules and regulations under which only one bargaining repre-
sentative will be recognized pursuant to a vote of the employees, the
sole question is whether the unit established by the public agency for
this purpose is reasonable and appropriate.
The standard by which a public agency is governed in determi-
nation of appropriate bargaining units is whether such a determination is
"reasonable."' 0  It is readily apparent that the test of reasonableness
is a vague one, and thus it becomes necessary to fashion more specific
criteria which public agencies may use as guidelines in establishing
units, i.e. to give substance to the term "reasonable" as it applies to
unit determinations.
Unlike the National Labor Relations Act governing the private sec-
tor, the federal executive order pertaining to bargaining by federal em-
ployees, and other state statutes which require bargaining with govern-
ment employees, the MMB Act fails to provide a neutral procedure for
establishing units in the first instance."1 Instead, the specific procedure
to be followed is left to the discretion of the local public agency (i.e.
the employer), and there is no statutory requirement of procedural
neutrality. 2 The act does provide that in the absence of local proce-
dures the dispute shall, upon the request of either party, be submitted
to the Department of Industrial Relations for mediation or recom-
mendation for resolving the dispute.13  The section does not apply
where a local procedure has been adopted. Since mediation does not
result in a binding decision 94 and since no provision is made in the act
90. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95.
91. Grodin, supra note 2, at 741 & n.98. For a short description of such unit de-
termination and recognition procedures elsewhere, see Schneider, Unit Determina-
tion: Experiments in California Local Government, 3 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REL. 1, 4-8
(Oct. 1969).
92. It has been suggested that "[clourts could determine, under the current statu-
tory provisions, that any system of unit determination which fails to provide for neutral
determination in the event of dispute is at least presumptively invalid .... " Grodin,
supra note 2, at 742.
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3507.1 (West Supp. 1974).
94. Government Code section 3501(e) defines mediation as an "effort by an im-
partial third party to assist in reconciling a dispute regarding wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment between representatives of the public agency and
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for a binding resolution of conflicts over unit determinations, final res-
olution of any dispute is left to the courts.
The MMB Act establishes no criteria as to unit determinations
generally, and the only basis for judicial review is the vague standard
of "reasonableness" found in section 3507. The act provides specific
criteria for unit determinations only for peace officers and and profes-
sional employees. A public agency is authorized under the act to adopt
rules prohibiting peace officers from joining, organizing or participating
in employee organizations unless the organization is composed solely
of such peace officers and concerned solely with employment matters
and professional advancement of peace officers. 95 Adoption of such
a rule would, of course, necessitate establishment of a separate unit for
peace officers. The act also gives professional employees the right to
be represented separately from nonprofessional employees by an or-
ganization consisting of such professional employees;96 it does not, how-
ever, expressly grant to one professional group the right to be repre-
sented separately from other professional groups." The only other
specific statutory guideline for the courts is the separate legislation of
the Labor Code under which firefighters have the right to separate rep-
resentation. 98
The court in Public Defenders held that the right of a particular
professional group to separate representation is to be determined under
section 3507 allowing a public agency to establish appropriate units.99
The court stated that "[tihe discretion given the county under section
3507 appears to be as broad as that given to the Labor Relations Board
under the National Labor Relations Act."'100 The NLRB exercises
wide discretion in determining the unit appropriate for collective bar-
gaining,'' a discretion which has been characterized as bordering on
finality.
10 2
The issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is one for
which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and none
should be by decision. It involves of necessity a large measure of
informed discretion, and the decision of the Board, if not final, is
rarely to be disturbed.
10 3
the recognized employee organization or recognized employee organizations through in-
terpretation, suggestion and advice." Id. § 3501 (e) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 3508.
96. Id. § 3507.3.
97. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
98. See note 82 supra.
99. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
100. Id. at 830, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
101. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422, rehearing denied,
331 U.S. 868 (1947).
102. Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1966).
103. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).
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Therefore, the board's determinations as to appropriate units, if reason-
able, are binding upon reviewing courts. 04
Although the court in Public Defenders did not state that a public
agency's discretion under section 3507 actually is as broad as that of
the NLRB in making unit determinations, the standard of reasonableness
does give the agency broad discretion. If this discretion were as broad
as that of the NLRB, it would seem that unless an agency violated the
statutory provisions as to peace officers, professional employees, or fire-
fighters, the unit found appropriate by the public agency would ordi-
narily be left undisturbed by the courts.
Arguably such broad discretion should not be vested in a public
agency. Unlike the NLRB, a public agency, as employer, is not neutral,
but rather is an interested party. To whatever extent the unit was not
established through a procedure ensuring neutrality, fairness requires
a court in settling a representational dispute to look more closely at the
record to determine whether the unit established is appropriate in light
of the particular circumstances.
Thus, in spite of the broad discretion the court in Public Defenders
seems to find in a public agency, the court itself determined on the
facts that Unit XI as established by the county was inappropriate. By
so holding, the court sanctioned a broader scope of review of unit de-
terminations under the MMB Act than is applicable to NLRB deter-
minations.
Appropriate Unit
In the Public Defenders decision, the court quoted Professor Gro-
din as follows:
Unit determinations are as critical to the bargaining process as dis-
tricting is to the political process. Such determinations affect not
only the number but also the character of the organizations which
represent an agency's employees. The definition of units may de-
termine, for example, such matters as 'whether traditional civil serv-
ice employees associations gain or lose strength in comparison to
unions, whether craft unions gain or lose strength in comparison to
unions seeking to represent employees on departmental or cross-
departmental bases, and the like. The procedure by which such
decisions are made, and the criteria brought to bear upon the deci-
sions, are among the most significant factors in any industrial rela-
tions system.10 5
As noted above,'0 6 the MMB Act does not provide any particular
procedure for making unit determinations nor does it set forth any gen-
104. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422, rehearing denied,
331 U.S. 868 (1947).
105. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396, quoting Grodin, supra note
2, at 738.
106. See text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
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eral criteria to be used. What guidelines, then, does the Public De-
fenders decision provide for making unit determinations? At the out-
set, it may be observed that the Public Defenders decision is very loosely
organized; and it is frequently difficult to determine how a particular au-
thority supports the court's conclusion that Unit XI was inappropriate.
The court made numerous disconnected references to the NLRA and
judicial decisions thereunder without stating how these authorities are
to be applied in construing the MMB Act and without relating these
authorities in any clear manner to the case decided. Indeed, it would
seem that in light of the wide discretion the court suggested is vested
in a public agency to make unit determinations, an application of ju-
dicial decisions under the NLRA to the facts of the Public Defenders
case would lead to the conclusion that Unit XI, as established by the
county, was not clearly unreasonable, and was, therefore, appropriate.
Apparently, the court wished to achieve two somewhat conflicting
goals: (1) to establish the principle that decisions under the NLRA
may be used as guidelines for deciding representation disputes under
the MMB Act, and (2) to decide the case at bar in favor of a separate
unit for attorneys in the public defender's office. Since unit determina-
tions are ordinarily factual determinations to be made on the basis of
the circumstances of each particular case, 107 the fact that the court os-
tensibly placed reliance on NLRA decisions is of great importance, and
the decision that attorneys are sui generis in relation to other profes-
sional groups is of relatively minor importance. Thus, it is appropriate
to look more closely at the Public Defenders and NLRA decisions to
extract therefrom any principles applicable to unit determinations in
general.
As noted by the court in Public Defenders,10 8 the language of "an
appropriate unit" in Government Code section 3507 parallels the lan-
guage of the NLRA allowing the National Labor Labor Relations Board
to certify labor organizations selected by a majority of employees in a
"unit appropriate for such purposes."'10 Having indicated that case law
construing the language of the NLRA is helpful in construing the similar
language of the MMB Act, 10 the court quoted Professor Grodin: "The
1971 'exclusive recognition' amendment to section 3507 uses the term
'appropriate unit,' arguably inviting reference to standards of appro-
priateness established elsewhere in the private and public sectors.""'
107. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944); NLRB v. Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 756 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965).
108. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
109. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
110. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
111. Id. at 830, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 395, quoting Grodin, supra note 2, at 741. The
court continued to quote Professor Grodin as follows: "It [the exclusive recognition
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What standards did the court find helpful? The court continued:
Numerous cases have pointed out that the board need not deter-
mine the ultimate unit or the most appropriate unit. The act re-
quires only that the unit be "appropriate." 112
Having stated the above, the court left it to be inferred that, like the
NLRB, a public agency is not required to establish the best of all pos-
sible units, but only a unit which is "appropriate." Like the legislature,
the court seems unwilling to commit itself to any binding rules appli-
cable to unit determinations. However, in accord with the foregoing
principle, the court's ruling that forcing the public defenders into Unit
XI is unreasonable leads to the conclusion not that Unit XI is less
appropriate than some other unit, but that Unit XI is not appropriate
at all.
Before turning to factors used by the NLRB in determining units,
it should be noted that under the NLRA the propriety of a unit is "a
question of fact to be determined by the board upon the facts of each
case.""' 8 The board has held that each unit determination must have
a direct relevancy to the circumstances within which collective bargain-
ing is to take place"14 and that there may be more than one way in which
the employees may appropriately be grouped." 5 Unlike a court, which
renders its decisions under the principle of res judicata, the NLRB is
not bound by its previous statements regarding the appropriateness of
a particular unit."' Furthermore, "prior board unit determinations in
other cases have precedential value only in the sense that they disclose
facts the board has previously considered relevant."M
The court in Public Defenders established this same case-by-case
principle for evaluating unit determinations under the MMB Act, quot-
ing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.: 11
8
amendment] also refers, however, to a vote of employees 'of the agency or an appro-
ate unit thereof,' suggesting that exclusive recognition may be accorded on an agency
wide basis without regard to whether lesser units would be appropriate." Whether the
statutory language permits an agency to accord exclusive recognition on an agency wide
basis is not an issue in Public Defenders and the court makes no comment on this por-
tion of the quote.
112. Id., citing Morand Bros. Beverage, 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 418 (1950), modified,
190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951); accord, Federal Elec. Corp., 157 N.L.R.B. 1130, 1132-
33 (1966); F.W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 307 (1963).
113. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 756 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 830 (1965).
114. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962).
115. May Dept. Stores Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 160, 161 (1969).
116. District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 1956).
117. NLRB v. Krieger-Ragsdale & Co., 379 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968).
118. 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944).
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Wide variations in the forms of employee self-organization and the
complexities of modern industrial organization make difficult the
use of inflexible rules as the test of an appropriate unit. Congress
was informed of the need for flexibility in shaping the unit to the
particular case and accordingly gave the Board wide discretion in
the matter. 119
Certainly, there are similar wide variations in the forms of employee
self-organization in the public sector.' Great complexities result from
the fact that the MMB Act governs the employer-employee relations
of a multitude of public employers of varying size, function, composi-
tion and purpose, 2' and these complexities would make the use of in-
flexibile rules as difficult in the public as in the private sector. That
is not to say that some guidelines or standards of appropriateness would
not be useful, or even necessary, but only that it would be unwise to
set forth inflexible rules of law governing the establishment of bargain-
ing units.
In determining the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, various
tests have been applied. The NLRB has traditionally looked to such
factors as "the community of interest among the employees sought to
be represented; whether they comprise a homogeneous, identifiable,
and distinct group; whether they are interchanged with other employ-
ees; the extent of common supervision; the previous history of bar-
gaining; and the geographic proximity of various parts of the employer's
operation." 122 In the public sector the most frequently mentioned
criteria are a clear and identifiable community of interest; a prior
history of employee bargaining; and the probability of effective dealings
and efficient operations resulting from the proposed unit. 12  A defi-
nite trend toward designing criteria to avoid fragmented bargaining
units in the public sector has been observed. 2 '
The ordinance pursuant to which Unit XI was established by the
County of Alameda included the three common criteria above men-
tioned. First, it provided that each unit "shall encompass as many posi-
119. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
120. See Schneider, supra note 2, at A-5, which discusses present public employer-
employee relationships in California and some of the vast differences, from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, in the strength, character and goals of employee organizations and in the
attitudes of employers to these organizations.
121. Government Code section 3501 (c) defines public agency to mean "every gov-
ernmental subdivision, every district, every public and quasi-public corporation, every
public agency and public service corporation and every town, city, county, city and
county and municipal corporation, whether incorporated or not and whether chartered
or not" but excluding for purposes of the MMB Act public school districts and the State
of California.
122. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 1412 (1966).
123. Shaw & Clark, supra note 67, at 154,
124. Id. at 154,
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tion classifications as possible" consistent with the organizational and
representation rights of the employees.125 Such a provision is reflective
of the county's interest as employer in having large units, which public
agencies usually find more efficient and manageable than small ones.
126
Within the limits of that policy, the criteria to be used in determining
units included such factors as community of interest, history of repre-
sentation, and general field of work. 27  Nonetheless, in considering
the appropriateness of Unit XI, the court seems to have relied solely
on the community of interest test.
The court in Public Defenders cited Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.1
2
1
as persuasive on this point.129  There the NLRB found that engineers
possessed a unique community of interest based upon the distinct na-
ture of their function, their separate supervision and work place, the
lack of substantial interchange with other professional employees, and
the fact they were separately hired by the departmental supervisor.
Applying these factors, the court found that the public defenders also
had a unique community of interest;130 and, having an organization of
their own, the public defenders were entitled to a separate unit.' 3 '
However, the court neither discussed nor apparently considered the
other factors normally used in making unit determinations.
A heavy reliance on the community of interest test tends to cause a
proliferation of units.' 32 The librarians in Unit XI, for example, presum-
ably have a function distinct from the agricultural inspectors in that unit;
they also have separate supervision, place of work and hiring procedures,
and have little interchange with agricultural inspectors. The same could
be said of agricultural inspectors in relation to auditors, or buyers in rela-
tion to engineers. If it is unreasonable to force attorneys into a unit
with librarians, planners, etc., would it not, then, also be unreasonable
to force librarians into a unit with agricultural inspectors and auditors?
A case can certainly be made for small units.' 33 Without such
125. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 830, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
126. ACIR REPORT, supra note 30, at 74; P-H 1973 PuB. PERSONNEL ADmI,.-
LAB. MAN. REL. 111 5222-23 [hereinafter cited as P-H, PPA].
127. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 830-31, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
128. 157 N.L.R.B. 791 (1966); accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 236
F.2d 939 (3rd Cir. 1956). Both of these cases upheld the establishment of a separate
unit for professional engineers based upon the record, neither reviewing body finding
the action of the agency below to be unreasonable or arbitrary. It does not follow that
the converse (i.e. including engineers in a unit with other professionals) would neces-
sarily be unreasonable and arbitrary, since the burden of showing the unreasonableness
of a unit is on the challenging party.
129. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 831-32, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
130. Id. at 831, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
131. Id. at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
132. Rock, supra note 78, at 1004.
133. Id. at 1005.
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units the specialized interests and needs of a single craft, classification
or department might be subordinated to the wishes of a larger unit's
majority.1 34 Minority groups are more likely to feel that their special-
ized interests have not been adequately recognized by the majority of
a large unit, leading to internal friction. 135 In addition, a smaller unit
which performs an essential function may be able to strike a better bar-
gain for itself if it does its own negotiating.1
36
The employee's main concern is to have a unit which will provide
him with the maximum amount of self-determination and economic
power. 137  From the standpoint of both the employer and the public,
however, it is crucial that unit determination be consistent with efficient
government operations.13 Too many units can result in an inconsistent
wage and benefit structure among employees doing essentially the
same work or can lead to interunion rivalry and "me-tooism," with the
employer caught in the middle, resulting in serious and continuing con-
flict and wage escalation.' 39 Moreover, because authority in the public
sector is divided, too many units can lead to staggering administrative
snarls. 4 ° In addition, the smaller the unit the more likely it is that
the employee organization will be required to bargain with lower level
management. Bargaining at lower levels will in turn affect the scope
of bargaining since the management representative may have limited
power to make agreements, particularly as to wages.'
An unmanageable proliferation of bargaining units may be pre-
vented by using the criterion of efficient governmental operations to
balance the community of interest test. In other words, the public
agency's legitimate interest in efficiency must be balanced against a
general policy favoring the right of public employees to exercise the
rights of self-organization. 42 It is not at all clear that the court in the
Public Defenders case applied such a balancing test. It can be in-
ferred, however, that some balancing did occur in light of the court's
conclusion that allowing a special unit for the public defenders would
not further burden the public agency in view of the right of individual




135. BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 78, at 324.
136. Rock, supra note 78, at 1005.
137. ACIR REPORT, supra note 30, at 74; P-H, PPA, supra note 126, 5223.
138. P-H, PPA, supra note 126, 5227.
139. Id. 5222. See BoK & DUNLOP, supra note 78, at 325.
140. P-H, PPA, supra note 126, 5222.
141. Id.
142. Id. 5227.
143. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 832, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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Although this note raises some question regarding the validity of
the court's statement concerning the burden placed on a public agency
by a greater number of units, it is certainly proper and indeed necessary
for a court to weigh the competing interests of the public agency and
the employees when reviewing the appropriateness of a particular unit.
Reference to the practice in the private sector provides additional sup-
port for such a balancing of interests:
In determining an appropriate bargaining -unit, the Board considers
two aspects of the problem. It must weigh the factors which indi-
cate a centralized management and integrated functioning of the
business with the factors which indicate that the employees do not
share a community of interest.'
44
In summary, the following standards of "appropriateness" may be
gleened from the Public Defenders opinion. First, a public agency
need not establish the ultimate or most appropriate unit; the MMB Act
requires only that the unit be "appropriate." Second, the appropriate-
ness of a unit is a question of fact to be determined by a public agency
on a case-by-case basis. Third, standards of appropriateness estab-
lished by the National Labor Relations Board are persuasive in deter-mining the appropriateness of a unit established under the MMB Act.
Fourth, in establishing appropriate units the public agency should bal-
ance its own interest in creating large units with that of the employees
in having smaller units. Finally, the standard by which the public
agency is to be governed in determining the appropriate bargaining unit
is whether or not such determination is reasonable.
Conclusion
In Alameda County Assistant Public Defenders Association v.
County of Alameda, the California Court of Appeal held that denying
recognition to the Alameda County Public Defenders Association vio-
lated section 3507 of the Government Code. The court's decision was
based on its conclusion that such a denial unreasonably forced profes-
sional employees with common interests and an organization of their
own choice into an organization with other professional employees with
whom there existed little, if any, community of interest. This note has
argued that this decision should be limited to its facts and that many
of the statements made by the court are dicta which serve to indicate
the probable direction of future case law, but which should be analyzed
in light of the overall bargaining structure contemplated by the MMB
Act and the practicalities of bargaining within such a framework.
Lacking a neutral procedure for creating units in the first instance,
general criteria for the creation of units, and a procedure for binding
144. NLRB v. Sunset House, 415 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir. 1969).
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settlement of disputes, the MMB Act burdens the courts with the diffi-
cult task of formulating principles of law to be followed in resolving
representational disputes. The apparent unwillingness of the Public
Defenders' court to articulate clear and binding rules of law is justified
by the need to establish units on a case-by-case basis considering the
particular circumstances within which bargaining will take place, and
in view of the need for flexibility in developing rules which will effec-
tuate the general purposes of the MMB Act.
As illustrated by the foregoing analysis, a requirement of general
recognition will not promote the purposes of the MMB Act and will,
in fact, undermine the bargaining structure contemplated by the legis-
lation. Therefore, the Public Defenders decision should not be inter-
preted to require such general recognition. Furthermore, the court did
seem to suggest individual employees should be given the same rights
granted to employee organizations; to do so, however, would not only
place an unreasonable burden upon public agencies, but would also
conflict with the general purposes of the act.
Other than the specific criteria provided for peace officers, profes-
sionals, and firefighters, the only statutory standard governing the ap-
propriateness of units is the vague standard of reasonableness. The
Public Defenders decision indicated that case law under the NLRA is
highly persuasive in reviewing the appropriateness of a bargaining unit
under the MMB Act, and it is to be expected that courts in the future
will continue to look to the NLRA experience for guidance in reviewing
the appropriateness of a unit established by a public agency under the
MMB Act.
While flexibility must be ensured, ad hoc judicial decisions are,
at best, an undesirable method of fashioning a comprehensive set of
rules to govern unit determinations and questions of representation in
the rapidly developing and complex field of public employee labor rela-
tions. Courts are not equipped with sufficient resources nor is it their
function to undertake what is essentially legislative action. There is
an obvious need for the California legislature to act in this area.
In March of 1973 the Assembly Advisory Council on Public Em-
ployee Relations submitted to the California Assembly its report145 rec-
ommending repeal in their entirety of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,
the George Brown Act, the Winton Act, and Labor Code sections 1960-
63. In their place the council recommended enactment of a compre-
hensive and preeemptive state law to govern public employee relations
which would grant full collective bargaining rights to public employees.
With respect to unit determinations, the council proposed the establish-
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ment of a Public Employment Relations Board which would be empow-
ered to make unit determinations, and further recommended general
criteria to be applied by the board in making such determinations. It
is to be hoped that in the near future the legislature will act upon these
or similar recommendations.
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